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CHECK YOUR PRIVACY RIGHTS AT THE FRONT GATE: 
CONSENSUAL SODOMY REGULATION IN TODAYS MILITARY 
FOLLOWING UNITED STATES v. MARCUM 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Marcum, l the latest judicial interpretation of the 
military's sodomy statute,2 the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces3 
created a delicate balance between seIVicemembers' privacy rights and 
Congress's right to regulate the military.4 While limiting the Supreme 
Court's privacy protections articulated in Lawrence v. Texas 5 in the mil-
itary context, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces crafted a new 
rule in which military members are now required to apply a multi-part 
test to determine if their conduct is protected.6 The resulting envi-
ronment is one in which seIVicemembers may not be precisely sure 
whether their private, consensual, sexual conduct is proscribed.7 
Upon closer examination, however, one need only look to the legiti-
macy of the underlying relationship-in the eyes of the military-to 
determine whether the sexual conduct will be criminal and 
prosecutable.8 
The Uniform Code of Military Justice codifies the military's sodomy 
statute in Article 125, which states: 
(a) Any person subject to this chapter who engages in 
unnatural carnal copulation with another person of the same 
1. 60 MJ. 198 (CAA.F. 2004). 
2. See 10 U.S.C. § 925, art. 125 (2000). 
3. The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces is the military's 
highest appellate court, one level below the United States Supreme Court, 
and it has jurisdiction over servicemembers throughout the world. CLERK 
OF THE COURT, THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED 
FORCES 1, available at http://www.armfoLuscourts.gov/CAAFBooklet.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 1,2005). The court was established as an Article I court by 
Congress. [d. Its judges serve fifteen year terms and are civilians. [d. at 8. 
To emphasize the civilian makeup of the court, Congress expressly stated 
that retired military members were to be excluded from appointment to 
the court. [d. Additionally, prior to 1994, the Court of Appeals for the 
Armed Forces was known as the Court of Military Appeals. [d. at 3. For 
clarity, this comment uses the name Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
for all cases decided by the court. 
4. See infra Part V.C. 
5. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overturning Texas's sodomy statute which prohibited 
same-sex sodomy on the grounds the law violated the Due Process clause). 
6. See infra Part IV.D.; Marcum, 60 MJ. at 205. 
7. See infra Part VA 
S. See infra Part V.C. 
239 
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or opposite sex or with an animal is guilty of sodomy. Pene-
tration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the offense. 
(b) Any person found guilty of sodomy shall be punished 
as a court-martial may direct.9 
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces' recent holding in 
United States v. Marcum has changed the scope, meaning, and under-
standing of Article 125 by creating a multi-part test to analyze sodomy 
cases. IO In creating the test, the court has followed the less than clear 
guidance of the Supreme Court's Lawrence decision and created a con-
stitutional, albeit cumbersome, standard for those in the military. I I 
This comment will analyze the scope of the constitutional right to 
privacy as it is applied in the military context and explore the limits of 
the military's sodomy statute in light of the new test (hereinafter 
called the "Marcum Test") .12 This comment will first address the his-
tory of sodomy statutes. Then, it will parse the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Lawrence v. Texas, the liberty right it created, and how the Court 
of Appeals for the Armed Forces' recent holding in United States v. 
Marcum interprets that right in a military setting. Next, this comment 
will evaluate the constitutionality of the Marcum Test in the military 
and how the Marcum decision applies to military personnel today. Fi-
nally, this comment will suggest alternatives to criminally charging ser-
vicemembers for engaging in consensual sodomy. 
II. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF SODOMY STATUTES 
A. Origins of Statutes Proscribing Sodomy 
The origin of sodomy laws in society stems from biblical interpreta-
tions of Genesis 19:4-11 from the Old Testament. I3 Based on the story 
9. 10 U.S.C. § 925, art. 125 (2000). 
10. Marcum, 60 MJ. at 205. 
11. See infra Part V.C. 
12. See infra Part IV.D. 
13. JOHN J. McNEILL, THE CHURCH AND THE HOMOSEXUAL 42-43 (Beacon Press 
1993); see also ROLAND A. BRINKLEY, JR. ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE MONO-
GRAPH VOL. II, No.4: THE LAws AGAINST HOMOSEXUALI1Y 11 (Inst. of Con-
temp. Corr. & the Behav. Sci., Sam Houston State Univ., Tex.) (n.d.); MARK 
D.JORDAN, THE SILENCE OF SODOM 121 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2000). The 
biblical verse is: 
But before they lay down, the men of the city, the men of Sodom, 
both young and old, all the people to the last man, surrounded the 
house; 5. and they called to Lot, "Where are the men who came to 
you tonight? Bring them out to us, that we may know them." 6. Lot 
went out of the door to the men, shut the door after him, 7. and 
said, "I beg you, my brothers, do not act so wickedly. 8. Behold, I 
have two daughters who have not known man; let me bring them 
out to you, and do to them as you please; only do nothing to these 
men, for they have come under the shelter of my roof." 9. But 
they said, "Stand back!" And they said, "This fellow came to so-
journ, and he would play the judge! Now we will deal worse with 
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of Sodom and Gomorrah, early Church teachings focused on God's 
vengeance upon the two cities for wide-spread homosexual activities. 14 
It was also taught that these" 'offenses against nature'" were the cause 
of a number of natural disasters and other catastrophes.15 Addition-
ally, church leaders argued that God had given humans the ability to 
engage in sexual relations for the sole purpose of procreation. 16 
To protect themselves from these curses and to promote procreativ-
ity, societies, through both civil and Church law, outlawed sodomy.17 
The crime was often described as, "that detestable and abominable 
crime (among Christians not to be named) .... "18 This view of sod-
omy carried into England19 and eventually flowed to America.20 
you than with them." Then they pressed hard against the man Lot, 
and drew near to break the door. 10. But the men put forth their 
hands and brought Lot into the house to them, and shut the door. 
11. And they struck with blindness the men who were at the door 
of the house, both small and great, so that they wearied themselves 
groping for the door. 
Genesis 19:4-11 (King James). 
14. McNEILL, supra note 13, at 42; see also LJ. Boon, Those Damned Sodomites: 
Public Images of Sodomy in the Eighteenth Century Netherlands, in THE PURSUIT 
OF SODOMY: MALE HOMOSEXUALIl:Y IN RENAISSANCE AND ENLIGHTENMENT 
EUROPE 237, 242, 246 (Kent Gerard & Gert Hekma eds., Harrington Park 
Press 1989) (discussing the historical view of sodomites pre-1730 in the 
Netherlands) . 
15. McNEILL, supra note 13, at 42; see also Boon, supra note 14, at 242. 
16. Richard Green, Sodomy Laws, in THE HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC SEXOLOGY 35, 
35 GamesJ. Krivacska &John Money eds., 1994); see also JAMES W. BUTTON 
ET AL., PRIVATE LNEs, PUBLIC CONFLICTS 179 (CQ Press 1997) (describing 
religious values as "procreatively-focused sexuality"); cj PAUL R. ABRAMSON 
ET AL., SEXUAL RIGHTS IN AMERICA: THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE PUR-
SUIT OF HAPPINESS 75 (N.Y. Univ. Press 2003) (pointing out that an argu-
ment could be made that the purpose of sex is to procreate, but concluding 
that the argument is "silliness, plain and simple"). 
17. McNEILL, supra note 13, at 42. Of interest, McNeill discusses the possible 
mistranslation of the story of Sodom and Gomorrah. Id. at 42-43. He lays 
out an argument, made by some biblical scholars, that the ultimate sin of 
"inhospitality" is what delivered God's wrath and not sexual deviancy. Id. at 
50. If true, McNeill opines that this would be one of history'S greatest iro-
nies. Id. 
18. JOSEPH CHITTI', 2 A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAw 51 (G. & C. 
Merriam, 3d Am. ed. 1836); see also RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHERINE B. 
SILBAUGH, A GUIDE TO AMERICA'S SEX LAws 65 (Univ. of Chicago Press 
1996) (stating that early laws containing the language "'crime against na-
ture,' were limited to anal intercourse"). Today, however, this definition 
has been commonly expanded to include fellatio, cunnilingus and bestial-
ity. Id.; see also B. ANTHONY MOROSCO, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF 
SEX CRIMES § 1.02, at 1-5 (Matthew Bender 1976). 
19. Green, supra note 16, at 37; see also POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 18, at 65. 
20. Jonathan Ned Katz, The Age of Sodomitical Sin, 1607-1740, in RECLAIMING 
SODOM 43, 43-44 Gonathan Goldberg ed., 1994); see also POSNER & 
SILBAUGH, supra note 18, at 65. 
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Before Henry VIII's Reformation Acts criminalized sodomy in 1533, 
sodomy had only been considered a sin against the church.21 Mter 
1533, however, sodomy, or "buggery" as it was often called, could, for 
the first time, be punished in civil courts.22 
This new crime was a felony and its offenders faced death and, in-
terestingly, loss of property.23 There was no exception for clergy who 
were usually only subjected to punishment by the church.24 This is 
important because it demonstrates, for the first time, a shift in power 
from the church to the state and exposes possible ulterior motives of 
the Reformation Parliament and Henry VIII.25 
B. Sodomy Statutes Cross the Atlantic 
As early as 1641, throughout colonial America, sodomy was a crime 
that was punishable by death.26 The Massachusetts Bay code of 1641 
made "man lying with man as with a woman" punishable by death.2' 
Even heterosexual sodomy was condemned.28 The New Haven Law of 
1656 "provided death for male-female anal intercourse, incitement to 
masturbation, and undefined acts of women 'against nature.' "29 In 
the agrarian colonies, procreation was not just God's will, it was 
viewed as a form of surviva1.30 Therefore, the consequences of non-
reproductive sexual acts were seen as an economic threat to society.31 
21. Katz, supra note 20, at 46-47; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568 
(2003); POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 18, at 65. 
22. Katz, supra note 20, at 47; see also POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 18, at 65; 
LESLIE]' MORAN, THE HOMOSEXUAL(flY) OF LAw 22 (Routledge 1996). 
23. Katz, supra note 20, at 47; see also PETER ROOK & ROBERT WARD, ROOK & 
WARD ON SEXUAL OFFENCES 125 (Sweet & Maxwell 2d ed. 1997). 
24. Katz, supra note 20, at 47; see also ROOK & WARD, supra note 23, at 125. 
25. Katz, supra note 20, at 47. While not further explored in this comment, 
Katz implies Henry VIII's motives were more about separating England 
from Roman Catholic rule by the Pope than his concern about sodomy. Id. 
at 46-47. In 1536, relying on this new law, Henry VIII charged a number of 
Catholic monks with this crime and was able to confiscate their monas-
teries' land and redistribute it. Id. 
26. Katz, supra note 20, at 47. 
27. Id. It seems ironic that one of the first regions to have an anti-homosexual 
statute would also be home to one of the first states to permit same-sex 
marriage. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 
2003). 
28. Katz, supra note 20, at 48. 
29. Id. This phrasing is generally understood to mean women performing oral 
sex on men. See DONAL EJ. MAcNAMARA & EDWARD SAGARlN, SEX, CRIME, 
AND THE LAw 196-97 (Free Press 1977) (stating that condemnation and 
punishment apparently did not deter men and women from engaging in 
these acts). 
30. Katz, supra note 20, at 44-45. A community required procreation to ensure 
it would have adequate labor. Id. 
31. Id. at 45; see also ABRAMSON ET AL., supra note 16, at 75. 
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At the time the Bill of Righ ts was ratified in 1791, sodomy was illegal 
in all thirteen original states.32 By 1868, thirty-two of thirty-seven 
states had criminalized sodomy.33 In 1961 every state criminalized 
sodomy; in that year Illinois became the first state to repeal its consen-
sual sodomy statute by virtue of adopting the Model Penal Code, 
which advocated for repealing consensual sodomy statutes.34 By 1986, 
when the Supreme Court heard arguments in Bowers v. Hardwick,35 
almost half of all states and Washington, D.C. still criminalized con-
sensual sodomy.36 Although the laws were largely ignored and not 
enforced in most jurisdictions, prosecutions for consensual sodomy 
still occurred, albeit rarely.37 
In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court held there was no funda-
mental right to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy.38 It found 
that "[p]roscriptions against [sodomy] have ancient roots,"39 and it 
cited a history of sodomy laws in this country dating back to 1791.40 
The Georgia statute at issue, which outlawed sodomy, regardless of 
whether heterosexual or homosexual, was validated.41 
By the time the Court heard arguments in Lawrence v. Texas,42 in 
2003, the number of states outlawing consensual sodomy had de-
creased by nearly half since Bowers.43 By virtue of the Court's holding 
32. Green, supra note 16, at 38; see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-
93 n.5 (1986) (listing states criminalizing sodomy). At least one of the 
founding fathers was aware of the criminalization of sodomy. Green, supra 
note 16, at 38. Thomas Jefferson apparently did not object to it being a 
crime, but did advocate repealing the death penalty for sodomy, preferring 
instead castration for sodomy offenders. [d. In 1800, Jefferson's Virginia 
replaced its death penalty for sodomy with a sentence of one to ten years in 
prison. [d. 
33. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-93. 
34. Green, supra note 16, at 39. 
35. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186 (oral arguments heard March 31, 1986); see also 
infra text accompanying notes 38-41 (describing Bowers). 
36. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193-94; see also JEAN L. COHEN, REGUlATING INTIMACY 94 
(Princeton Univ. Press 2002). 
37. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 198 n.2 (Powell, j., concurring); see also POSNER & 
SILBAUGH, supra note 18, at 66 (citing the Bowers case); Anne B. Goldstein, 
History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determi-
nants of Bowers v. Hardwick, in SEX, MORALITY, AND THE LAw 32, 32 (Lori 
Gruen & George E. Panic has eds., 1997) (stating that it took ten hours for a 
prosecutor to ultimately decide not to prosecute Hardwick, during which 
time Hardwick and his partner were in jail). 
38. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92. 
39. [d. at 192. 
40. [d. at 192-93 n.5. 
41. [d. at 188-89. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a) (1984) stated that "[a] person 
commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual 
act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of 
another." 
42. 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003) (oral arguments heard March 26, 2003). 
43. [d. at 573 (decreasing from twenty-five states in 1986 to thirteen by 2003). 
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in Lawrence,44 consensual, noncommercial sodomy between adults is 
no longer a crime in any state.45 Surprisingly, however, there remains 
one last jurisdiction in America that still has a consensual sodomy stat-
ute: the United States military.46 
C. Sodomy Statutes in the United States Military 
The Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") was signed into law 
on May 5, 1950,47 and the original sodomy statute articulated therein 
has remained virtually unchanged for nearly fifty-five years.48 The 
UCMJ is rooted in military history and has its base in the Articles of 
War of 1775,49 which traces its lineage to the British Articles of War of 
1749.50 Although the British Articles of War of 1749 did expressly pro-
scribe sodomy, calling it an "unnatural and detestable sin,"51 with a 
sentence of death,52 the United States military, prior to 1920, had no 
express sodomy statute.53 Pre-1920, the crime was charged under Arti-
cle 96,54 the general article or "catch-all."55 Mter 1920, however, a 
prohibition on sodomy was added as a specific statute in the Articles 
44. [d. at 578. 
45. [d. 
46. 10 U.S.C. § 925, art. 125 (2000); see also United States v. Marcum, 60 MJ. 
198, 206 (C.A.AF. 2004). 
47. Pub. L. 81-506, 64 Stat. 107 (1950); see also Lieutenant Colonel James B. 
Roan & Captain Cynthia Buxton, The American Military justice System in the 
New Millennium, 52 AF. L. REv. 185, 187-89 (2002) (discussing the various 
factors which lead to the development of the UCMJ). 
48. Compare id. at art. 125 (1950) ("Any person subject to this code . ... "), with 
10 U.S.C. § 925(a) (2000) ("Any person subject to this chapter . ... ") (em-
phasis added). 
49. JONATHAN LURIE, ARMING MILITARY JUSTICE 3 (Princeton Univ. Press 1992); 
see also Roan & Buxton, supra note 47, at 187. 
50. Edmund M. Morgan, The Background of the Uniform Code of Military justice, 28 
MIL. L. REv. 17, 18 (1965). 
51. Articles for War of the Royal Navy § 29 (1749), reprinted in N.A.M. RODGER, 
ARTICLES OF WAR, at 27 (Kenneth Mason 1982). The sodomy provision 
stated, in full, that" [i]f any person in the fleet shall commit the unnatural 
and detestable sin of buggery and sodomy with man or beast, he shall be 
punished with death by the sentence of a court-martial." [d. 
52. [d. 
53. See United States v. Harris, 8 MJ. 52, 53 (C.M.A. 1979); see also Major Eu-
gene E. Baime, Private Consensual Sodomy Should be Constitutionally Protected in 
the Military by the Right to Privacy, 171 MIL. L. REv. 91, 94 (2002) (discussing 
the development of sodomy laws in the military). 
54. Harris, 8 MJ. at 53; see Baime, supra note 53, at 94. 
55. Article 96, the General Article of the Articles of War of 1916, provides: 
Though not mentioned in these articles, all disorders and ne-
glects to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, all 
conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service, 
and all crimes or offenses not capital, of which persons subject to 
military law may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general 
or special or summary court-martial according to the nature and 
degree of the offense, and punished at the discretion of such court. 
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of War and was later codified in the UCMJ.56 In 1978, the Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces clearly articulated the scope of Article 
125: "[b]y its terms, Article 125 prohibits every kind of unnatural car-
nal intercourse, whether accomplished by force or fraud, or with con-
sent. Similarly, the article does not distinguish between an act 
committed in the privacy of one's home, with no person present other 
than the sexual partner .... "57 This prohibition against private, con-
sensual sodomy would eventually set the military apart from the rest of 
American jurisdictions. 58 
III. CONSENSUAL SODOMY STATUTES IN AMERICA AFTER 
LAWRENCE v. TEXAS 
The Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas expressly over-
turned its earlier decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, which had upheld 
states' consensual sodomy statutes.59 In Lawrence, two men,John Law-
rence and Tyron Garner, were convicted of violating the Texas sod-
omy statute after the police entered their apartment on a supposed 
weapons disturbance complaint and discovered the pair "engaging in 
a sexual act."60 The case made its way through the Texas appellate 
process with courts relying on the Supreme Court's, then authorita-
tive, holding from Bowers. 61 
In Lawrence, the Supreme Court determined that Texas's interest in 
proscribing the type of consensual, private conduct prohibited by the 
statute was neither "legitimate [n] or urgent."62 Relying on history, 
the Court noted that provisions outlawing sodomy were rarely en-
forced "against consenting adults acting in private."63 Additionally, 









Federal Possession and Control Act, ch. 418, § 3, 39 Stat. 619, 666 (1916); 
see also DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, U.S. WAR OFFICE, A MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL, 283, 285-86 (Gov't Printing Office 1917). 
Sodomy is specifically referred to under the "Crimes or Offenses not 
Capital" section and to be charged under the general article, Article 96. Id. 
The proof required was the same as that for "Assault to Commit any Fel-
ony" from Article 93. Id. at 252, 286. 
Uniform Code of Military Justice: Hearings on H.R 2498 Before a Subcomm. of the 
H. Comm. on the Armed Seroices, 81st Congo 1233 (1949) (referring to previ-
ous Article of War 93 as reference for breaking-out sodomy as its own stat-
ute, Article 125, in the first Uniform Code of Military Justice); see also 
Baime, supra note 53, at 94-96. 
United States v. Scoby, 5 MJ. 160, 163 (C.MA 1978). 
See infra Part III. 
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
Id. at 562-63; see also Diana Hassel, National Interest: Lawrence v. Texas: 
Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 565, 566 
(2004) (reciting the facts from Lawrence). 
See Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 359-62 (Tex. App. 2001); see also Law-
rence, 539 U.S. at 563. 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577. 
Id. at 569; see also supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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to abolish sodomy statutes.64 The Court therefore overruled Bowers, 
calling the holding "not correct when it was decided, and . . . not 
correct today,"65 and extended a liberty interest to private, consensual 
sexual conduct.66 
Although the Supreme Court expressly overruled its Bowers decision 
in Lawrence, the implications of the Lawrence decision have been the 
subject of much debate.67 For example, as Justice O'Connor would 
point out in her concurrence, the Texas statute, unlike the Georgia 
statute in Bowers, only outlawed same sex sodomy.68 This may leave 
open a question in the future as to whether a statute forbidding sod-
omy could be applied equally to all, as the military's sodomy statute is, 
and not just between those of the same sex.69 
Adding to the Lawrence debate is the fact the Court, in coming to its 
conclusion, did not expressly articulate which constitutional standard 
of review it applied.70 Justice Scalia, in his dissent to Lawrence, charac-
terized it as an "unheard-of form of rational-basis review. "71 Professor 
Laurence Tribe, however, argues that the standard of review used was 
not "mysterious."72 He states that based on the analytical path the 











Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570; see also supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
Id.; see also Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The ''Fundamental Right" 
That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1894, 1935-37 (2004). 
See, e.g., Susan Austin Blazier, The Irrational Use of Rational Basis Review in 
Lawrence v. Texas: Implications For Our Society, 26 CAMPBELL L. REv. 21, 25 
(noting the court's implication that any victimless conduct which occurs in 
private in one's own home may now be legal); Nan D. Hunter, SexualOrien-
tation and the Paradox of Heightened Scrutiny, 102 M1CH. L. REv. 1528, 1532-33 
(2004) (discussing three types of "antigay" legislation that appellate courts 
upheld even after Lawrence to demonstrate the possible limits of Lawrence); 
Hassel, supra note 60, at 577 (stating the results of Lawrence are not yet fully 
understood) . 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003) ("A 
person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with 
another individual ofthe same sex."). The section title of the sodomy law is 
even named "Homosexual Conduct." Id. 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring). But see Blazier, 
supra note 67, at 30 (arguing equal protection is not a valid basis on which 
to strike down a gender-neutral sodomy statute). 
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (holding that petitioners' Due Process rights 
were violated without stating which standard of review was applied); see gen-
erally Colin Callahan & Amelia Kaufman, Constitutional Law Chapter: Equal 
Protection, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 17, 19-28 (2004) (providing an overview of 
the standards of review in equal protection analysis). The three levels of 
review generally used by the Court are rational basis, heightened scrutiny, 
and strict scrutiny. Id. at 22. The higher the level of scrutiny, the more 
difficult it becomes for legislation to survive judicial review. Id. at 21. For 
example, classifying something as a fundamental right will require strict 
scrutiny of any statute that infringes upon the fundamental right. Id. at 19. 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
Tribe, supra note 66, at 1916-17. 
381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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the standard used was "obvious."75 Professor Tribe, by implication, 
claims the standard was some sort of heightened scrutiny because the 
Court methodically cited the history of personal rights cases and 
stated that, "'protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause has a 
substantive dimension of fundamental significance in defining the 
rights of the person.' "76 Regardless, the majority based its decision on 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti-
tution and provided some privacy protections for adults engaging in 
consensual sodomy.77 
The Court's constitutional protection of consensual sodomy, how-
ever, was not limitless as certain parameters applied: "[ t] he present 
case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might 
be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where con-
sent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or 
prostitution. "78 
These limits would later become the cornerstone of the Court of 
Appeals of the Armed Forces' development of the Marcum Test.79 
IV. HOW THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES 
INTERPRETS ARTICLE 125 TODAY: UNITED STATES v. 
MARCUM 
While Lawrence seemed to provide a far-reaching umbrella of pri-
vacy protections, the question of how those rights would be inter-
preted in a military setting remained unresolved until the appeal of 
Air Force Technical Sergeant (E-6) Eric Marcum in 2003.80 Marcum 
was the supervising noncommissioned officer of a flight of intelli-
gence linguists.81 He developed a variety of close relationships with 
his male subordinates and, allegedly, had "sexual encounters" with six 
of them.82 He was charged with violating UCM] Articles 92, 125, and 
134, and was ultimately found guilty at court-martial of violating all 
three articles and also Article 128.83 
74. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
75. Tribe, supra note 66, at 1917. 
76. [d. (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565) (emphases omitted) (alteration 
omitted). 
77. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79. 
78. [d. at 578. 
79. See infra Part IV.D. 
80. United States v. Marcum, 60 MJ. 198, 198 (C.AAF. 2004); see generally 
Baime, supra note 53 (arguing in a pre-Lawrence article that the right to 
privacy in the military was protected, and private, consensual sodomy 
should be allowed based on Bowers). 
81. [d. at 200. 
82. [d. 
83. Supplemental Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 2-3, United States v. Eric P. 
Marcum, 60 MJ. 198 (C.AAF. 2004) (No. 02-0944/ AF) (stating Marcum 
was charged with one count of Article 92, failure to obey an order or regu-
lation by providing alcohol to persons under twenty-one, three counts of 
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Of importance to this comment, the court-martial found that one of 
Marcum's violations of Article 125 was for consensual sodomy and not 
the non-consensual sodomy that had been charged.84 It was this con-
viction for consensual sodomy which formed one of the bases for Mar-
cum's appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.85 
A. The Relationship and Act at Issue 
This particular conviction stemmed from Marcum's relationship 
with Senior Airman (E-4) Robert Harrison, one of Marcum's subordi-
nates.86 Following a night of drinking, Harrison returned with Mar-
cum to Marcum's apartment,87 where, before going to bed, Harrison 
took off all of his clothing with the exception of his boxer shorts and· 
T-shirt.88 He then went to sleep on Marcum's couch and at some 
point during the night he awoke to the following: "I looked down and 
I was trying to keep my eyes closed because I felt something strange 
and I didn't know exactly what was going on but I opened my eyes just 
enough to see Sergeant's head over my crotch and I felt his mouth on 
my penis. "89 
Of importance to the appellate court, Harrison testified that al-
though he said nothing at the time and simply rolled over, the en-
counter made him "scared, angry, and uncomfortable" and he 
confronted Marcum about the incident to ensure, "this sort of thing 
d[id]n't ever happen again."90 
Highlighting the apparent consensual nature of their relationship, 
on cross-examination Harrison admitted that he continued to go out 
drinking with Marcum, would spend the night at Marcum's apart-
ment, sent Marcum gifts from his travels, and even told Marcum that 
Article 125, sodomy without consent, and five counts of Article 134, general 
article to include indecent acts and also convicted of Article 128 for 
assault}. 
84. [d. at 2. 
85. Marcum, 60 MJ. at 199-200. Marcum was originally sentenced on May 24, 
2000 and none of his subsequent appeals included the consensual sodomy 
charge, however, his appeal was pending when Lawrence was decided and 
he was ultimately granted a review of this issue as well. See United States v. 
Marcum, 59 MJ. 131 (CAA.F. 2003) (granting review of supplemental is-
sue, the consensual sodomy charge, in light of Lawrence); United States v. 
Marcum, 58 MJ. 205 (C.AAF. 2003) (granting review of two issues, not 
including sodomy); United States v. Marcum, 2002 CCA LEXIS 173 (AF. 
Ct. Crim. App. 2002) (affirming sentence while reviewing issues not includ-
ing consensual sodomy charge). 
86. Marcum, 60 MJ. at 200; Supplemental Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 4, 
Marcum, 60 MJ. 198 (No. 02-0944/ AF). 
87. Marcum, 60 MJ. at 200. 
88. Supplemental Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 4, Marcum, 60 MJ. 198 (No. 
02-0944/ AF) (testimony of Harrison). 
89. [d. at 5. 
90. Marcum, 60 MJ. at 201. 
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"he [Harrison] loved him [Marcum] ."91 For his part, Marcum admit-
ted only to "kissing [Harrison's] penis twice."92 Additionally, both 
men testified that they had had a previous encounter in which Harri-
son had apparently lain down on top of Marcum and was "moving his 
pelvis area against [Marcum's] butt ... [Harrison] had an erection 
"93 
The court-martial jury, a panel of officer and enlisted members, 
found Marcum innocent on the forcible sodomy charge, "but guilty of 
non-forcible sodomy in violation of Article 125."94 Thus, in light of 
the Lawrence ruling, the door was opened for an appellate challenge 
of Marcum's conviction.95 
B. Standard of Review 
From the onset of its consideration of Marcum's appeal, the Court 
relied on its previous holding from United States v. Scoby96 in asserting 
that "Article 125 forbids sodomy whether it is consensual or forcible, 
heterosexual or homosexual, public or private."97 The court then 
considered whether Article 125 remained constitutional after Law-
rence.98 Because the case presented a constitutional question, the 
court reviewed this case de novo.99 Following an in-depth review of 
Lawrence, the Marcum court was persuaded that the Supreme Court 
did not rely on any particular method of traditional constitutional 
analysis. lOo The court was particularly focused on the limits articu-
lated by the Lawrence Court stating, "[ t] he Supreme Court did not ex-
pressly state whether or not this text represented an exhaustive or 
illustrative list of exceptions to the liberty interest identified .... "101 
In deciding which standard of review to use, the court acknowl-
edged the use of "either the rational basis test or strict scrutiny might 
well prove dispositive of a facial challenge to Article 125."102 However, 
the court was compelled by neither and opted for a case by case analy-














Supplemental Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 6, Marcum, 60 MJ. 198 (No. 
02-0944/AF); Marcum, 60 MJ. at 20l. 
Marcum, 60 MJ. at 200. 
Id. at 20l. 
Id. 
Id. at 199-200; see also supra note 85 (detailing the issues granted for review 
in Marcum's various appeals). 
5 MJ. 160 (C.M.A. 1978). 
Marcum, 60 MJ. at 202. 
Id. at 202-07. 
Id. at 202-03 (citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 190 (1964)). 
Id. at 204. 
Id. at 203. 
Id. at 204; see also supra note 70 (discussing the different standards of 
review). 
Marcum, 60 MJ. at 205. Relying on the Supreme Court's distaste for broad, 
facial challenges the court cited Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 
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ysis, the Marcum court argued, required a constitutional review based 
on the Due Process Clause. 104 
Further, the court noted that the Lawrence court failed to articulate 
the privacy interest at issue in the case as a fundamental right.105 
Thus, the court would not take it upon itself to impute a fundamental 
right to members of the military where the Supreme Court had not 
even extended it in a civilian context. 106 
C. Lawrence in the Military Environment 
The Marcum court concluded that Lawrence applied in the military 
context, but it refused to adopt the decision's implications for the mil-
itary.107 The court determined that the application of Lawrence re-
quired a different standard for servicemembers than it would for 
civilians.108 Focusing on various cases where the court has upheld ser-
vicemembers' rights,109 the court stated it had routinely extended the 
protections of the Bill of Rights to the military, "except in cases where 
the express terms of the Constitution make such application inappo-
site."llo The court explained that '" [t]he military is, by necessity, a 
specialized society,"'l11 and therefore, "it is clear that servicemembers, 
as a general matter, do not share the same autonomy as civilians."1l2 
In this context, the court cites First and Fourth Amendment cases 
where the protected liberty interest in a civilian context does not with-
stand similar inquiry in a military context because of unique military 
requirements inherent in providing the United States' national de-
fenseY3 Thus, based on its previous preference for a case-by-case test 











(2004), in which the Supreme Court noted that facial challenges are "espe-
cially to be discouraged." Id. at 206. 
Id. at 205; see also supra note 77 and accompanying text (noting the Su-
preme Court also based its decision on the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment). 
Marcum, 60 MJ. at 205. 
Id. 
Id. at 206. 
Id. at 205-06. 
Id. at 205 (citing Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 u.S. 503, 507, 509 (1986) 
(military regulation prohibiting wear of religious headgear does not violate 
the First Amendment), superseded by statute, National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-180, 101 Stat. 1086 
(allowing wear of religious headgear in certain circumstances) and United 
States v. Mitchell, 39 MJ. 131, 135 (C.MA 1994) (upholding annual evalu-
ation requirement of military judges as within the Fifth Amendment». 
Id. 
Id. (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) (finding neither Arti-
cle 133, conduct unbecoming an officer, nor Article 134, general article, 
void for vagueness or constitutionally overbroad». 
Id. at 206. 
Id. at 205-06 (citing United States v. Priest, 21 C.MA 564, 570 (C.MA 
1972) (First Amendment) and United States v. McCarthy, 38 MJ. 398, 403-
04 (C.MA 1993) (Fourth Amendment». 
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the court determined the appropriate challenge for Article 125 sod-
omy cases is to be limited to the facts of each case that served as the 
basis for conviction.1l4 The Marcum court then laid out a two-step test 
to determine whether a constitutionally protected zone of privacy ex-
ists in each case.1l5 
D. The Court's New Rule: The Multi-part Marcum Test 
To analyze Article 125 consensual sodomy cases, the court stated 
one must take a two-step approachY6 First, a court must analyze 
whether an accused's sexual conduct was within Lawrence's protections 
and second, if not within Lawrence's protections, the court must deter-
mine if the accused's sexual conduct was of the type proscribed by 
Article 125.117 To analyze this first part, the court developed a novel 
three prong test to apply in military cases: 
First, was the conduct that the accused was found guilty of 
committing of a nature to bring it within the liberty interest 
identified by the Supreme Court? Second, did the conduct 
encompass any behavior or factors identified by the Supreme 
Court as outside the analysis in Lawrence? Third, are there 
additional factors relevant solely in the military environment 
that affect the nature and reach of the Lawrence liberty 
interest?1l8 
Although the Marcum court did not break each prong of the test 
into individual elements, clearly each prong is comprised of its own 
requirementsY9 An evaluation of the components of the test will aid 
one in applying a discrete set of facts to the Marcum Test.120 This new 
three-prong Marcum Test will determine if Lawrence's liberty interest 
applies in a military setting to the conduct in question, and, thus, 
whether the conduct will be protected.121 The first prong enunciates 
which conduct comes within the scope of Lawrence's protection while 
the last two prongs describe exceptions which may give otherwise pro-










Id. at 206. 
Id. at 206-07. 
Id. at 208. 
Id. This comment focuses on analyzing the first step of the analysis. The 
second step, whether the behavior actually violated Article 125, i.e. was the 
sexual act sodomy, will necessarily be determined during an analysis of the 
first part. See infra note 126 and accompanying text. Thus, this comment 
refers to the entire test as the Marcum Test, although technically the Mar-
cum Test presented here analyzes only the dispositive first step. 
Id. at 206-07 (citation omitted). 
Id. 
This analysis of the Marcum Test is applied to various factual scenarios later 
in the comment. See discussion infra Parts IV.E., F. and V.C. 
Marcum, 60 MJ. at 206-07. 
Id. 
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1. The First Prong-Sexual Conduct Within Lawrence's Protections 
In the first prong, whether the conduct is within the scope of Law-
rence, there are four requirements, which, if all are satisfied, allows the 
analysis to proceed to the next prong of the Marcum Test.123 Here, 
the court states that the ultimate question to ask is, "did [the ac-
cused's] conduct involve private, consensual sexual activity between 
adults?"124 Thus, the four requirements that must be satisfied in this 
first prong of the Marcum Test are: 125 
a. Was the conduct sexual activity?126 
b. Was the conduct in private, as opposed to in public? 
c. Was the conduct consensual? 
d. Was the conduct between adults?127 
Again, if all four of these questions are answered in the affirmative, 
the conduct is presumably protected pending the outcome of the next 
two prongs of the Marcum Test.128 If at least one question is answered 
in the negative, then the analysis is complete as the conduct falls 
outside the protective shield of Lawrence, and therefore IS 
prosecutable. 129 
2. The Second Prong-General Exceptions to Lawrence's Protections 
The second prong of the test enunciates the first set of exceptions 
to Lawrence's protection.130 It asks whether, satisfYing the first prong 
notwithstanding, the conduct nonetheless falls outside the scope of 
Lawrence by virtue of any of the exceptions stated in Lawrence. 131 If any 
of these exceptions are found, i.e., any of the below questions are an-
swered in the affirmative, the conduct would not be protected. 
Here there appear to be four exceptions:132 
a. Did the conduct involve prostitution?133 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 207. 
125. Id. 
126. Although the court articulates this question as "sexual activity," in context, 
the court was referring to sodomy. See id. 
127. The court gave some guidance on its interpretation of consent and chil-
dren in a post-Marcum case. While discussing other issues, the court stated 
in United States v. Banker that while, "a child under the age of 16 may factu-
ally consent to certain sexual activity, this Court has never recognized the 
ability of a child to legally consent to sexual intercourse or sodomy." 60 
MJ. 216, 220 (CAA.F. 2004). 
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b. Did the conduct involve persons who might be injured 
or coerced? 134 
c. Did the conduct involve persons who were situated in re-
lationships where consent might not be easily refused? 135 
d. Did the conduct involve other circumstances that would 
tend to place the conduct outside the scope of 
Lawrence? 1 ~6 
253 
In its holding the court explained this prong of the Marcum Test 
with some unnecessary steps. For example, the court asked whether 
the conduct involved minors or was in public.137 This is duplicative; if 
either of these were true, the analysis presumably would not proceed 
beyond the first part of the Marcum Test which requires the conduct 
to be private and between adults.138 
Additionally, the injury or coercion to which the Lawrence court re-
fers is unclear,139 although one could, presumably, get to this step of 
the analysis if the accused had taken advantage of an incompetent 
adult. In a situation like that, while the sexual contact may have been 
technically "consented to" and was in private, an incompetent adult 
could be unknowingly, and even willingly, injured. The state, it 
seems, would have a legitimate interest in a case like that. 
As for the second half of the second exception, coercion, the Court 
of Appeals for the Armed Forces has previously stated that a "coercive 
atmosphere ... includes, for example, threats to injure others or state-
ments that resistance would be futile"140 and that "[c]onsent [ ... ] 
induced by ... coercion is equivalent to physical force."141 Byapply-
ing these definitions, the logical inference is that behavior compelled 
by force would not be consensual. Thus, this exception is also unnec-
essary as the Marcum Test's first prong, specifically the requirement 





138. See supra Part IV.D., notes 126-29 and accompanying text. 
139. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). While it is unclear what type 
of injury either the Lawrence Court or the Marcum court was referring to, as 
is demonstrated below, physical and emotional injuries could be conceptu-
alized. While physical injuries would potentially result from a rape, that 
scenario would be dealt with in the first prong of the Marcum Test and 
therefore not survive to be analyzed in the second prong. Additionally, any 
type of scenario involving emotional injury would likely involve some sort of 
doctor-patient, senior-subordinate, or adult-child relationship which would 
be analyzed using other prongs or exceptions rather than under this excep-
tion. See infra Part V.C. 
140. United States v. Simpson, 58 MJ. 368, 377 (CAA.F. 2003) (citing MANUAL 
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, Pt. IV, para. 45.c. (l)(b) (2002». 
141. [d. (omissions in original) (quoting United States v. Palmer, 33 MJ. 7, 9 
(C.MA 1991». 
142. See supra Part IV.D. 
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The third exception in this second prong of the Marcum Test, in-
volving the ability to easily refuse consent, is important in the military 
context because of the military's hierarchical nature. 143 As the court 
points out, "the nuance of military life is significant."144 The Air 
Force's regulation governing unprofessional relationships further ar-
ticulates the importance of the policy maintaining professional rela-
tionships in the military context: 
[T] he nature of the military mission requires absolute confi-
dence in command and an unhesitating adherence to orders 
that may result in inconvenience, hardships or, at times, in-
jury or death. This distinction makes the maintenance of 
professional relationships in the military more critical than 
in civilian organizations. 145 
Indeed, this part of the test is where the Marcum court would eventu-
ally find that Marcum's conduct, involving a senior-subordinate rela-
tionship, was an exception to the reach of Lawrence's protections. 146 
As to the final exception in this prong of the test, other circum-
stances placing the conduct outside Lawrence's protections, the Mar-
cum court left open the range of conduct which might be 
encompassed.147 The court noted the Supreme Court had failed to 
express whether the Lawrence exceptions it articulated were inclusive, 
thus the court was likewise unwilling to limit itself.148 Therefore, 
when analyzing conduct that does not seem to fit into any of the previ-
ous exceptions, one must ensure that the conduct might not somehow 
fit under this "other circumstances" exception, assuming that the con-
duct would not be considered a military-unique factor encompassed 
by the final prong of the test. 149 
In sum, in the second prong of the Marcum Test there are four ex-
ceptions to Lawrence's protections which would bring one's conduct 
outside of constitutional protections: prostitution, likelihood of in-
jury, inability to refuse consent and the catch-all, other circumstances. 
While seemingly limited to these four exceptions, their application to 
143. See e.g., Air Force Instruction 38-101 §§ 2.2, 2.3, Air Force Organization, at 8-
12 (April 21, 2004), available at http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/ 
af/38/afi38-101/afi38-101.pdf (describing the various organizations and 
chain of command structure within the Air Force). 
144. United States v. Marcum, 60 MJ. 198, 207 (C.A.A.F. 2004). 
145. Air Force Instruction 36-2909 Professional and Unprofessional Relationships, §1 
at 2 (May 1, 1999), available at http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/ 
36/ afi36-2909 / afi36-2909. pdf. 
146. See infra Part IV.E. 
147. Marcum, 60 MJ. at 207 (using the open-ended language "for instance" to 
describe examples of conduct). 
148. [d. at 205; see also supra note 78 and accompanying text (listing the excep-
tions to the protections of Lawrence). 
149. See Marcum, 60 MJ. at 207. 
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a wide variety of fact patterns, especially in a hierarchical organiza-
tion, seems limitless. 
3. The Third Prong-Military Unique Exceptions to Lawerence's 
Protections 
The final prong of the Marcum Test is, in essence, a military specific 
catch-all; it asks whether any military-unique factors would create ex-
ceptions to the applicability of Lawrence?150 
This prong will likely have broad application in light of the Su-
preme Court's, and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces', view 
that "[t]he fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent 
necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within 
the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible 
outside it."151 
Although this prong was not analyzed by the Marcum court,152 it will 
likely be used in future cases. Indeed, in the only other case in which 
the court has applied the Marcum Test, United States v. Stirewalt,153 this 
part was used when none of the previous parts of the test applied. 154 
In Stirewalt, Stirewalt performed sodomy on a superior officer, who 
presumably could have easily refused consent.155 The court relied on 
this last prong to place Stirewalt's behavior outside of Lawrence's pro-
tections, because none of the previous prongs were applicable. 156 
This final prong, because of its open-endedness, may cause the most 
confusion about what conduct is protected within the military context. 
It is conceivable, albeit unlikely, that virtually all military sodomy con-
victions with even the slightest military nexus could stand based upon 
this prong alone. 
To understand how the court will likely use the overall Marcum Test, 
this comment will now explore the only two cases the Court of Ap-
peals for the Armed Forces has decided using the Marcum Test: United 
States v. Marcum and United States v. Stirewalt. 157 
150. Id. 
151. Id. (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974». See also Major Steve 
Cullen, Prosecuting Indecent Conduct in the Military: Honey, Should we get a 
Legal Review First?, 179 MIL. L. REv. 128, 160-63 (2004) (arguing military 
should be treated the same as civilians for private sexual acts and that Parker 
v. Levy should be limited to the First Amendment); Baime, supra note 53, at 
127-32 (arguing there are no compelling reasons to proscribe consensual 
sodomy in the military). 
152. See id. at 208 (deciding Marcum on the second prong of the test and not 
discussing the third). 
153. 60 MJ. 297 (C.A.A.F. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1682 (2005). 
154. See infra Part IV.F. 
155. Stirewalt, 60 MJ. at 303-04. 
156. Id. at 304. 
157. See infra Parts IV.E-F. 
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E. The Marcum Test as Applied to Technical Sergeant Marcum 
The court found that Marcum's conduct fell outside the protections 
of Lawrence, and thus, Marcum's conviction for consensual sodomy 
stood. 158 In arriving at this determination the court found that the 
first prong of the Marcum Test, whether the conduct was between con-
senting adults in private, was satisfied by virtue of the court-martial 
finding of consensual sodomy.159 The court "assume[d] without de-
ciding" that these two adults' conduct was consensual and in 
private. 160 
The court took a more in depth view of the second prong of the 
Marcum Test, whether the conduct fell outside the scope of Lawrence 
by virtue of any of the exceptions enunciated in Lawrence, and con-
cluded Harrison "was a person 'who might be coerced.' "161 In so do-
ing, the court primarily focused on one exception in the second 
prong, namely whether the conduct involved persons who were in re-
lationships where consent might not be easily refused. 162 Eventually, 
it was this element that would prove to be insurmountable for 
Marcum.163 
The conclusion here seems inevitable. Marcum was two grades se-
nior to Harrison; he was his direct supervisor and a noncommissioned 
officer as well.164 The court stated that not only was this conduct a 
violation of Article 125, it also fell under Article 92, in that the unpro-
fessional relationship was a failure to obey a regulation, specifically Air 
Force Instruction 36-2909,165 which forbids relationships "when they 
detract from the authority of superiors or result in, or reasonably cre-
ate the appearance of, favoritism, misuse of office or position, or the 
abandonment of organization.al goals for personal interests."166 
Having disposed of the case on the second prong of the Marcum 
Test, the court did not analyze the third prong of the test167 and al-
lowed Marcum's conviction for consensual sodomy to stand.168 How-
ever, a little more than a month after deciding Marcum, the court did 
analyze the third prong of its test in United States v. Stirewalt. 169 
158. Marcum, 60 MJ. at 208, 211. 
159. Id. at 207. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 207-08 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003». 
162. Id. 
163. Marcum, 60 MJ. at 207-08. 
164. Id. at 200, 208. 
165. Id. at 207-08. 
166. Air Force Instruction 36-2909 Professional and Unprofessional Relationships, 
§ 2.2, at 2 (May 1, 1999), available at http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pub 
files/af/36/afi36-2909/afi36-2909.pdf. 
167. Marcum, 60 MJ. at 208. 
168. Id. at 208, 211. 
169. 60 MJ. 297, 304 (C.A.A.F. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1682 (2005). 
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F. The Marcum Test Applied in United States v. Stirewalt 
Health Services Technician Second Class Darrell Stirewalt (E-5) was 
convicted, after two trials, of one count of consensual sodomy, under 
Article 125, UCMJ. 170 In his first trial, Stirewalt was convicted of forci-
ble sodomy of a superior officer;171 however, on appeal he won a re-
trial based upon an evidentiary issue. 172 At his retrial Stirewalt 
entered a guilty plea to one count of consensual sodomy under Article 
125.173 
The court, for the first time after Marcum, employed its own Marcum 
Test analysis to the facts in Stirewalt. 174 As to prong one, whether the 
sexual conduct was between consenting adults in private, and prong 
two, whether the conduct fell under any of the Lawrence exceptions, 
the court "assume[d] without deciding," that the conduct was within 
the scope of Lawrence. 175 
Based on its ruling here and in Marcum the court seems unlikely to 
analyze prong one of the test if a court-martial concludes a member is 
guilty of consensual sodomy.176 Additionally, where, as in Stirewalt, 
the accused is subordinate to the alleged victim, it is unlikely the court 
will find a situation where consent could be coerced or not easily re-









Id. at 298-99. 
Id. at 298,304; see also United States v. Stirewalt, 53 MJ. 582 (C.G. Ct. Crim. 
App. 2000), afj'd, United States v. Stirewalt, 60 MJ. 297 (CAAF. 2004). 
Stirewalt, 60 MJ. at 298-99; see United States v. Stirewalt, 53 MJ. 582, 587-90 
(C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2000) (finding that Military Rule of Evidence 412, the 
rape shield law, only shields victims of nonconsensual sexual misconduct). 
Stirewalt successfully argued that a former roommate of the alleged victim, 
who was allowed to testifY regarding a previous consensual adulterous affair 
with Stirewalt, should have been able to be cross-examined regarding a dif-
ferent consensual sexual relationship she had had with another enlisted 
man and the punishment she (the former roommate) had received. Id. at 
587-88. As a result, Stirewalt argued he was not able to establish a defense 
that the victim in his case knew the repercussions of her actions and was 
only accusing him to protect her career. Id. at 588. This finding by the 
Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals was further explained later by the 
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in United States v. Banker, 60 MJ. 
216, 218-21 (C.AAF. 2004). It stated, "[Military Rule of Evidence] 412 
hinges on whether the subject of the proffered evidence was a victim of the 
alleged sexual misconduct and not on whether the alleged sexual miscon-
duct was consensual or nonconsensual." Id. at 220. 
Stirewalt, 60 MJ. at 303. 
Id. at 304. The court referred to its test as a "tripartite framework." Id. 
Id. 
See Stirewalt, 60 MJ. at 303-04; United States v. Marcum, 60 MJ. 198, 207 
(CAAF. 2004). 
Compare Marcum, 60 MJ. at 208 (subordinate "victim"), with Stirewalt, 60 
MJ. at 304 (superior officer "victim"). The court assumes prong two is sat-
isfied in Stirewalt where the alleged victim is senior to the accused, id., how-
ever, in Marcum, the accused was senior to the alleged victim, thereby 
warranting an analysis under prong two of the Marcum Test. Marcum, 60 
MJ. at 208. But see United States v. Gamez, 2005 CCA LEXIS 109 (AF. Ct. 
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court was left with only one option and decided this case based on the 
third prong of the Marcum Test, whether any military-unique factors 
affect the reach of Lawrence. 178 
Noting that the relationship in question was between an officer, 
who happened to be Stirewalt's department head, and a subordinate 
enlisted crew member,179 the court quoted from the Coast Guard's 
Personnel Manual: 
Romantic relationships between members are unaccept-
able when: 
1. Members have a supervisor and subordinate relation-
ship ... , or 
2. Members are assigned to the same small shore unit 
... , or ... 
3. Members are assigned to the same cutter .... 180 
This policy applies regardless of rank, grade, or 
position. t81 
In light of the Coast Guard's military-unique regulations and "the 
clear military interests of discipline and order that they reflect," the 
court placed Stirewalt's conduct outside of the protection of Law-
rence. 182 Further, the court specifically stated that the fact only the 
subordinate Stirewalt was charged did not "alter the nature of the lib-
erty interest at stake."183 For the second time in as many opportunities 
the court affirmed a servicemember's court-martial conviction of con-
sensual sodomy.184 
v. THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES' NEW 
STANDARD, ITS CONSTITUTIONALIlY AND APPLICABILIlY 
TODAY 
Even before the Supreme Court decided Lawrence in 2003,185 ser-









Crim. App. Mar. 30, 2005) (finding that a senior-subordinate consensual 
heterosexual sexual relationship, with a subordinate "victim," warranted 
analysis under the third prong, other military unique factors, and not the 
second prong, inability to easily refuse consent, as was the case with a simi-
lar (albeit homosexual) fact pattern in Marcum). 
Stirewalt, 60 MJ. at 304. 
Id. 
A cutter is a "small, lightly anned [motor]boat used by the Coast Guard." 
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 451 (4th ed. 2000). 
Stirewalt, 60 MJ. at 304 (quoting COAST GUARD PERSONNEL MANUAL, Interper-
sonal Relationships within the Coast Guard, para. 8.H.2.f at 8.H 4-5 (change 38, 
2002), available at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-w/g-wp/g-wpm/PersMan/ 
PERSMAN%200pening.pdf (Unacceptable Romantic Relationships». 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. at 305; see also supra Part IV.E. 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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on two fronts: it violates their right to privacyIS6 and is void for vague-
ness. IS7 As was previously discussed, the Marcum and Stirewalt rulings 
have quashed, for now, the latest attacks on the military's sodomy stat-
ute under right to privacy principles enunciated in Lawrence. ISS Yet, in 
deflecting the right to privacy attack, the court may have left itself 
susceptible to an attack based on the void for vagueness principle1s9 
when it created the three-prong Marcum Test. 19o 
A. Void for Vagueness 
The Supreme Court's standard for void for vagueness doctrine has 
been oft cited: "The doctrine incorporates notions of fair notice or 
warning. Moreover, it requires legislatures to set reasonably clear 
guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to 
prevent 'arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."'191 
In United States v. Scoby the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
specifically analyzed the phrase "unnatural carnal copulation" for 
vagueness.192 In Scoby, the court reviewed holdings from various state 
courts, which were mixed,193 and determined the proper backdrop to 
analyze the vagueness claim was the Due Process Clause.194 The 










See supra Part N.C. See also, e.g., United States v. Allen, 53 MJ. 402, 410 
(CAA.F. 2000) (holding sodomy with a spouse, in private, is not a pro-
tected privacy right when "not in furtherance of the marriage"); United 
States v. Thompson, 47 MJ. 378, 379 (CAA.F. 1997) (holding husband 
had no right to privacy guarantee with his wife when sodomy occurred 
while he was assaulting her); United States v. Henderson, 34 MJ. 174, 176-
78 (C.M.A. 1992) (holding that consensual heterosexual fellatio is not pro-
tected by a right to privacy under the Constitution); United States v. Scoby, 
5 MJ. 160, 164-66 (C.MA 1978) (holding no right to privacy protection 
when sex acts occurred in semi-private living quarters); see also Baime, supra 
note 53, at 110-114 (discussing, pre-Lawrence, the right to privacy and sod-
omy within the military environment). 
See, e.g., United States v.Johnson, 30 MJ. 53, 56 (C.MA 1990) (finding that 
a charge of aggravated assault was not void for vagueness in light of the 
defendant being warned he could be criminally liable for any acts of sod-
omy); Scoby, 5 MJ. at 163 (holding the proscriptions of the military'S sod-
omy statute are understood by a person of ordinary intelligence). 
See supra Parts N.E-F. 
See infra Part VA. 
See supra Part N.D. 
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 752 (1974) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 
U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974». 
5 MJ. 160, 161-63 (1978). 
Id. at 161-62. Alaska, Ohio, and Florida had ruled that definitions similar to 
the one used here were unconstitutionally vague. Id. While the United 
States Supreme Court, in Rnse v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49-50 (1975), along with 
the state courts of New Jersey, Nevada, Michigan, Missouri, Indiana, Maine, 
Oklahoma, and New Mexico did not view "crimes against nature," or like 
definitions, as unconstitutionally vague. State v. Lair, 301 A.2d 748, 752 
(NJ. 1973). 
Scoby, 5 MJ. at 162. 
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Clause requires is that the law give sufficient warning that men may 
conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden."195 With 
this standard, the court reviewed the history of the phrase "crimes 
against nature," which it felt was similar to "unnatural carnal copula-
tion,"196 and opined, as did the Supreme Court, that anyone who 
wanted to know what particular acts would fit under this language 
could have easily determined them. 197 With this finding, the Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces easily determined the phrase was de-
fined well enough so that the average service member would under-
stand what it means, and therefore, the phrase was not 
unconstitutionally vague.198 
In another case, United States v. Johnson, the Court of Appeals for the 
Armed Forces found a charge for aggravated assault was not void for 
vagueness when the underlying act was consensual sodomy.199 In 
Johnson, however, the service member was given specific warnings that, 
due to his HIV positive status and the harm that could befall others if 
he were to engage in sodomy, he could be held criminally liable.20o 
With the court's creation of the Marcum Test, one could surmise the 
court changed what was once, arguably, an understandable statute 
into one that the servicemember of "ordinary intelligence"201 might 
not understand. Courts, however, attempt to avoid constitutional con-
cerns when they create limiting tests;202 therefore, it would seem, to 
remain constitutional the Marcum Test would have to be interpreted 
in lock-step with Lawrence. Thus, one could argue that for ser-
vicemembers, just like civilians, consensual, non-economic, private 
sodomy between adults should not be outlawed.203 This argument 
fails, however, because constitutional rights in the military setting are 
not interpreted in lock-step with the civilian world.204 
195. [d. (quoting Rose, 423 U.S. at 50). 
196. [d. "'~he ,I?,hrase has been in use among English-speaking people for many 
centunes. [d. 
197. [d. Interestingly, the court did not define the specific acts which might 
define this phrase, stating that "some esoteric acts may not easily be identifi-
able as within or without the scope of Article 125," however, it did quote 
the United States Supreme Court citing the Missouri Supreme Court, 
which stated that the phrase "embraced sodomy, bestiality, buggery, fella-
tio, and cunnilingus within its terms." [d. at 162-63 (quoting Rose, 423 U.S. 
at 50). 
198. [d. at 163. 
199. 30 MJ. 53, 56 (C.MA 1990). 
200. [d. 
201. Scory, 5 MJ. at 163. 
202. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 211 (2003). "If a reasonable limiting 
construction 'has been or could be placed on the challenged statute' to 
avoid constitutional concerns, we should embrace it." [d. (quoting 
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1,44 (1976)). 
203. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
204. See infra Part V.B. 
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B. Constitutional Rights as Applied to Military Members 
While the Supreme Court has said, "men and women in the Armed 
Forces do not leave constitutional safeguards and judicial protection 
behind when they enter military service,"205 the Court has also noted 
that military life is not the same as civilian life206 and therefore, due 
process rights might be less in the military sphere.207 
The Marcum court itself proclaimed that, "an understanding of mili-
tary culture and mission cautions against sweeping constitutional pro-
nouncements that may not account for the nuance of military life."208 
The court also remarked, however, that the Lawrence Court had failed 
to limit the liberty interest it sought to protect to only civilians, thus 
implicitly granting the rights to military personne1.209 
Yet, in the military context, "(j]udicial deference ... 'is at its apo-
gee' when reviewing congressional decision making in th[e] [Due 
Process] area."210 Therefore, while the rights articulated in Lawrence 
would apply to military members, Congress enjoys latitude in regulat-
ing those rights. 211 
205. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 194 (1994) (Ginsburg,]., concurring) 
(finding appointments of military judges within the scope of both the Arti-
cle II Appointments Clause and the Fifth Amendment). 
206. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 749, 758 (1974). 
207. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981) (determining that Con-
gress's requiring men, and not women, to register for the draft did not 
violate the men's Due Process rights partly because of combat restrictions 
placed on women). But see Captain Dale A. Riedel, By Way of the Dodo: The 
Unconstitutionality of the Selective Service Act Male-Only Registration Requirement 
Under Modern Gender-Based Equal Protection, 29 U. DAYrON L. REv. 135 (2003) 
(arguing in today's world Rostker no longer applies). See also Cullen, supra 
note 151, at 160-63 (discussing Parker v. Levy and arguing that simply be-
cause First Amendment restrictions are placed against the military, the 
same urgency does not exist when dealing with the consensual sexual con-
duct described by Lawrence). 
208. United States v. Marcum, 60 MJ. 198,206 (C.A.A.F. 2004). 
209. Id. 
210. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (quoting Rostker, 453 U.S. 
at 70) (holding that military judges were sufficiently insulated from com-
mand influence to satisfy due process requirements). 
211. See Parker, 417 U.S. at 756 (finding that differences between military and 
civilian life warrants applying different constitutional standards when re-
viewing constitutional questions arising in the military context). But see 
Baime, supra note 53, at 130-32 (stating it is "disingenuous to argue that 
private consensual sodomy is prejudicial to good order and discipline or 
service discrediting" to maintain that there exists a military need to intrude 
into servicemembers' bedrooms); Cullen, supra note 151, at 162-63 (argu-
ing the military has no "particular need to regulate the adult, consensual, 
noncommercial, private sex-related decisions of its members"). See also 
James M. Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Ser-
vicemen'5 Constitutional Rights, 62 N.C. L. REv. 177 (1984). Although over 20 
years old, this article provides a still useful, in-depth discussion of constitu-
tional rights as they apply in the military context. See id. 
262 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 35 
Against this backdrop, the Marcum court faced the difficult task of 
balancing servicemembers' constitutional rights against Congress's Ar-
ticle I right to regulate the military.212 The result was the compromise 
Marcum Test,213 whereby the court has left Congress's law in place, 
while simultaneously expanding the rights of most, but not all, ser-
vicemembers to fit within the scope of Lawrence.214 
C. What Conduct is Now (Im)permissible in the Military Environment? 
There are few foreseeable circumstances which would warrant pros-
ecuting private, consensual sodomy between adults.215 For now, the 
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has found two situations that 
merit prosecution.216 First, Marcum made clear that the existence of a 
senior-subordinate relationship between the parties fails the second 
prong of the Marcum Test if the person charged is the senior person, 
regardless of the consensual nature of the homosexual or heterosex-
ual conduct.217 Second, based on Stirewalt, a senior-subordinate rela-
tionship can fail the third prong of the Marcum Test if the person 
performing the act is the subordinate person, regardless of the con-
sensual nature of the homosexual or heterosexual conduct.218 
What these two holdings have in common is that the underlying 
relationship which formed the basis for the sexual contact was in itself 
impermissible in the military setting.219 Thus, for servicemembers try-
212. Marcum, 60 MJ. at 206; U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8, d. 14. 
213. See supra Part IV.D. 
214. See supra Parts III., IV.C. 
215. See POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 18, at 66. 
216. See supra Parts IV.E-F. 
217. See supra Part IV.E. But see supra note 177 (discussing the Air Force Court of 
Criminal Appeals's use of the Marcum Test's third prong to uphold the con-
viction of the senior officer in a senior-subordinate relationship). 
218. See supra Part IV.F. 
219. See supra Parts IV.E-F.; cf United States v. Bullock, ARMY 20030534 (A. Ct. 
Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2004) (mem.). This was the first case to be decided by 
a lower military appeals court since the Marcum ruling took effect. The 
United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals, applying the Marcum Test, 
overturned an unmarried, male soldier's heterosexual consensual sodomy 
conviction with a female civilian where there was no military nexus. Id. at 4-
5. This case further supports the relationship-based analysis because the 
relationship here was not proscribed (male military member and adult fe-
male civilian) by military regulations or the UCMJ. See id. at 5; see also 
United States v. Myers, 2005 CCA LEXIS 44 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 
2005) (upholding consensual sodomy conviction of male military member 
and adult female, civilian spouse of another military member based on 
third part of Marcum Test, unique military factors); United States v. Avery, 
2005 CCA LEXIS 59 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2005) (upholding con-
sensual sodomy conviction of married male military member with adult fe-
male civilians based on third prong of Marcum Test, unique military 
factors); United States v. Bart, 61 MJ. 578 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2005) (up-
holding consensual sodomy conviction of unmarried female military mem-
ber with co-worker, married male military member based on third prong of 
Marcum Test, unique military factors); United States v. Christian, 61 MJ. 
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ing to determine if their conduct is proscribed or not, the ultimate 
question should be whether the underlying relationship is prohibited, 
either by regulation or the UCMJ. In fact, the government in Marcum 
focused on the unprofessional relationship cases that have been ap-
plied to heterosexual sodomy.220 
Based on this permitted/not-permitted relationship analysis, the 
Marcum court's implication that it was not considering the impact of 
the holding on the military's homosexual policy becomes somewhat 
clearer.221 In summing up the Marcum Test, the court stated that it 
need not determine what constitutional impact the military's homo-
sexual policy would have on the sodomy statute.222 Until the court 
completely works through the Marcum Test in a situation that would 
otherwise be protected, but for its homosexual nature, this issue will 
not be resolved. Nevertheless, the implication, which is consistent 
with a relationship-based analysis, is that even if an accused satisfies 
the first two prongs of the Marcum Test, he or she may still not over-
come the conviction by virtue of the impermissibility of the homosex-
ual relationship and the "unique conditions of military service," thus 
failing to satisfy the Marcum Test's third prong.223 
560 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2005) (upholding consensual sodomy conviction 
of married, male military member with unmarried civilian female based on 
third prong of Marcum Test, unique military factors); United States v. 
Gamez, 2005 CCA LEXIS 109 (AF. Ct. Crim. App. March 30, 2005) (up-
holding consensual sodomy conviction of married, male military officer 
with unmarried female enlisted military member based on third prong of 
Marcum Test, unique military factors). These cases further support the rela-
tionship analysis. In all, the relationships were proscribed by Article 134, 
the general article, as adultery. 10 U.S.C. § 934, art. 134 (2000); see also 
MANUAL FOR COURTs-MARTIAL Pt. IV, para. 62, at IV-97 (2002 Edition). In 
fact, all servicemembers were also convicted for adultery. Myers, 2005 CCA 
LEXIS 44, at *1, *7; Avery, 2005 CCA LEXIS 59, at *1, *6; Bart, 61 MJ. at 
579, 584; Christian, 61 MJ. at 561, 567; Gamez, 2005 CCA LEXIS 109, at *1. 
In Gamez, however, Gamez's adultery charge was conditionally dismissed on 
appeal. Gamez, 2005 CCA LEXIS 109, at *13. This does not change the 
relationship-based analysis because Gamez's conviction for fraternization 
with an enlisted female member was allowed to stand. Id. at *14-16. 
220. See Supplemental Final Brief on Behalf of Appellee at 10-11, United States 
v. Marcum, 60 MJ. 198 (C.A.AF. 2004) (No. 02-0944/ AF) (citing United 
States v. Ayers, 54 MJ. 85 (C.A.AF. 2000) (consent in an inappropriate 
relationship does not preclude a conviction, here a military instructor and 
trainee); United States v. Boyett, 42 MJ. 150 (C.A.A.F. 1995) (conviction 
affirmed for sexual relationship between officer and enlisted person under 
Article 133, Conduct Unbecoming an Officer); United States v. Bygrave, 46 
MJ. 491 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (HIV positive service member having unprotected 
sex convicted of assault)). 
221. Marcum, 60 MJ. at 208. 
222. Id. (referring to 10 U.S.C. § 654 which is the "Policy concerning homosexu-
ality in the armed forces" and is commonly referred to as the "don't ask, 
don't tell" policy); see 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) (2000). 
223. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a) (8) (A); see also discussion supra Part IV.F. For example, 
Stirewalt's consensual, heterosexual sodomy charge was also analyzed, and 
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Therefore, a consensual, non-commercial heterosexual relationship 
between adults, whether military-military or civilian-military, that does 
not violate any of the military's unprofessional relationship regula-
tions224 or other laws (not including the sodomy statute), would be 
permissible.225 The same homosexual relationship, however, by virtue 
of 10 U.S.C. § 654, would likely not be protected. 
VI. ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO CHARGING CONSENSUAL 
SODOMY 
If the military courts of appeals continue to follow the relationship-
based analysis226 then actually charging sodomy as a crime would not 
only be unnecessary because the underlying relationship will be 
prosecutable,227 it may also be multiplicious. 
A. Use oj Alternate Punitive Articles oj the UeM] 
Relying on the relationship-based analysis, a number of alternatives 
are available to military prosecutors to punish military members en-
gaged in impermissible relationships, regardless whether any sexual 
contact has occurred.228 In its supplemental brief, to support the le-
gitimacy of the sodomy statute, the government cited a number of 
cases that were disposed of with other than Article 125 convictions.229 
Even the Marcum court pointed out that the conduct Marcum was 
convicted of, Article 125, consensual sodomy, could have been 
charged under Article 92, for violating a regulation,23o because Mar-










upheld, on the basis of military unique factors, namely an impermissible 
senior-subordinate relationship. See supra Part IV.F. 
See infra Part VIA. 
See United States v. Bullock, ARMY 20030534 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 
2004) (mem.) (overturning consensual sodomy charge between military 
member and civilian where underlying relationship was permissible). 
See supra Part V.C. 
See supra note 219 and accompanying text (charging servicemembers with 
relationship-based crime as well as consensual sodomy). 
See infra notes 236-43 and accompanying text. 
See Supplemental Final Brief on Behalf of Appellee at 10-11, United States 
v. Marcum, 60 MJ. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (No. 02-0944/AF) (citing United 
States v. Ayers, 54 MJ. 85 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (upholding Articles 92, Failure to 
Obey a Regulation and 134, General Article conviction for military instruc-
tor having adulterous relationship with trainee); United States v. Boyett, 42 
MJ. 150 (C.A.A.F. 1995) (affirming Article 133, Conduct Unbecoming an 
Officer, conviction for sexual relationship between officer and enlisted per-
son); United States v. Bygrave, 46 MJ. 491 (CA.A.F. 1997) (upholding as-
sault conviction of HIV positive service member having unprotected sex». 
United States v. Marcum, 60 MJ. 198,208 (CA.A.F. 2004). 
Id. at 207-08; seeAir Force Instruction 36-2909, Professional and Unprofessional 
Relationships paras. 2.1, 2.2, 4, 5, 5.1 (May I, 1999), available at http://www. 
e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/36/afi36-2909/afi36-2909.pdf. 
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Thus, consensual sodomy cases that come under the umbrella of 
"unprofessional relationships" can be charged under Article 92, for 
failure to follow a regulation,232 Article 133, for conduct unbecoming 
an officer,233 or Article 134, the general article, which is also the arti-
cle under which adultery is charged.234 
Additionally, consensual homosexual sodomy cases can be handled 
administratively under 10 U.S.C. § 654, the military's homosexual pol-
icy, with, for example, an administrative discharge.235 The policy cov-
ers, in detail, Congress's belief that "[t]here is no constitutional right 
to serve in the armed forces,"236 the distinct differences between civil-
ian and military life,237 the steps to be taken to separate ser-
vicemembers if they meet certain homosexual "qualifiers,"238 and 
some of the rights of those targeted by the statute.239 
The sodomy statute is thus duplicative as applied to homosexuals, if 
the government's purpose is to separate those who have, or would, 
engage in consensual homosexual conduct.24o 10 U.S.C. § 654 clearly 
232. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 892 art. 92 (2000): 
Failure to obey order or regulation 
Any person subject to this chapter who-
(1) violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation; 
(2) having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by a mem-
ber of the armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey 
the order; or 
(3) is derelict in the performance of his duties; shall be punished 
as a court-martial may direct. 
[d.; see also MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, Pt. IV, para. 16, at IV-23-25 
(2002). 
233. See Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice, 10 U.S.C. § 933 art. 133 (2000). "Con-
duct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman: 
Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of con-
duct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be punished as a court-
martial may direct." [d.; see also MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, Pt. IV, para. 
59, at IV-93 (2002). 
234. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 934 art. 134 (2000). 
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders 
and neglects to the pn:judice of good order and discipline in the 
armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the 
armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which per-
sons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cogni-
zance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according 
to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at 
the discretion of that court. 
[d.; see also MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, Pt. IV., para. 60, at IV-94 (2002). 
235. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000); see also THE MILITARY COMMANDER AND THE 
LAw 230-32 (Thomas L. Strand & Michael W. Goldman eds., 7th ed. 2004) 
(instructing commanders on the process for administratively separating ho-
mosexual servicemembers). 
236. 10 U.S.c. § 654(a)(2). 
237. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a) (8)(A)-(B). 
238. Author's term; see 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (1)-(3). 
239. 10 U.S.c. § 654(d). 
240. See Supplemental Final Brief on Behalf of Appellee at 6-7, United States v. 
Marcum, 60 MJ. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (No. 02-0944/ AF); see also THE MILl-
266 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 35 
covers the breadth of homosexual conduct, even covering non-acts, as 
the statute covers those who say they are homosexual without ever hav-
ing committed a homosexual act. 241 Therefore, based solely on the 
government's interest to separate homosexuals from military service, 
the sodomy statute adds only a criminal conviction242 which, when 
taken in conjunction with the administrative discharge that 10 U.S.C. 
§ 654 requires, does nothing more than provide a newly separated ho-
mosexual servicemember with a federal conviction with which to re-
start his or her life.243 
Charging Article 125, consensual sodomy, in almost every instance, 
becomes duplicative at the least, and multiplicious at most. Further, it 
leaves a case vulnerable to a constitutionally grounded appellate re-
view if a conviction is awarded based on a consensual sodomy 
charge.244 
B. Multiplicity 
The protection from multiplicity is based upon the Fifth Amend-
ment principle "against double jeopardy [which] provides that an ac-
cused cannot be convicted of both an offense and a lesser-included 
offense."245 To raise a claim of multiplicity, an accused must raise the 
issue at trial or the issue will only be reviewed by an appellate court for 
plain error. 246 The idea that two charges are "factually the same" is a 
basic premise of a multiplicity claim.247 The Court of Appeals for the 








[An] [a]ppellant may show plain error and overcome 
[waiver] by showing that the specifications are facially duplica-
TARY COMMANDER AND THE LAw, supra note 235, at 230-32 (requiring a com-
mander to initiate administrative discharge proceedings and only allowing 
an Under Other than Honorable Condition discharge if certain circum-
stances exists, such as force, sex with a minor, in public, for money, in a 
prohibited senior-subordinate relationship, or on a military vessel); 10 
U.S.C. § 654. 
See 10 U.S.c. § 654(b)(2) (requiring only a finding that a servicemember 
"intends to engage in homosexual acts"). 
10 U.S.c. § 925, art. 125(b) (2000) ("punished as a court-martial may 
direct"). 
10 U.S.C. § 654(b). The statute requires that a service member "shall be 
separated from the armed forces under regulations prescribed by the Sec-
retary of Defense." Id. Based on principles of statutory construction, this 
implies an administrative discharge, not a court-martial, because when a 
court-martial is preferred the statute will articulate that. See, e.g., supra 
notes 238-39; see also THE MILITARY COMMANDER AND THE LAw supra note 
235, at 230-31 (emphasizing that a commander is required to begin separa-
tion processing when the commander has found the servicemember vio-
lated 10 U.S.C. § 654). 
See supra Parts IV.D. and V.B. 
United States v. Hudson, 59 MJ. 357, 358 (C.A.A.F. 2004). 
Id. 
Id. at 359 (quoting United States v. Lloyd, 46 MJ. 19,23 (C.A.A.F. 1997)). 
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tive, that is, factually the same. The test to determine 
whether an offense is factually the same as another offense, 
and therefore lesser-included to that offense, is the "ele-
ments" test. Under this test, the court considers whether 
each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does 
not. Rather than adopting a literal application of the ele-
ments test, this Court [has] stated that resolution of lesser-
included claims can only be resolved by lining up elements 
realistically and determining whether each element of the 
supposed lesser offense is rationally derivative of one or 
more elements of the other offense-and vice versa. 
Whether an offense is a lesser-included offense is a matter of 
law that this Court will consider de novo.248 
267 
Post-Marcum, this test was employed by the Air Force Court of Crim-
inal Appeals to determine whether adultery, consensual sodomy, and 
fraternization convictions were multiplicious.249 Ultimately, in that 
case the court determined that the fraternization and consensual sod-
omy charges were not multiplicious, while the adultery and fraterniza-
tion were.250 Interestingly, the court was persuaded by the factual 
distinction of "sexual intercourse" versus "fellatio" when it determined 
that the fraternization and sodomy charges were "factually 
distinguishable. "251 
This ruling creates an interesting legal twiSt.252 If, on the one hand, 
a servicemember is involved in an unauthorized relationship and en-
gages in sexual intercourse and sodomy, the servicemember can be 
charged with both fraternization and sodomy, without the charges be-
ing multiplicious.253 If, however, on the other hand, this same ser-
vicemember only goes so far as to engage in sodomy within the 
unauthorized relationship, the fraternization and sodomy charges 
would be multiplicious because they would both be based upon sod-
omy, and thus "factually the same."254 
248. United States v. Gamez, 2005 CCA LEXIS 109, at *7-8 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 
March 30, 2005) (quoting Hudson, 59 MJ. at 359 (citations omitted)) (em-
phasis added by lower court). 
249. [d. at *2, *7-8. 
250. [d. at *13 (finding the adultery and fraternization were both based on the 
same factual act of "sexual intercourse"). 
251. [d. 
252. Gamez., 2005 CCA LEXIS 109, at *13. 
253. [d. 
254. [d. at *8, *13; see also text accompanying supra note 251. If the Air Force 
Court of Criminal Appeals found the fraternization and adultery convinc-
tions multiplicious because they were both based on the act of "sexual inter-
course," it follows that fraternization and sodomy would have to be 
multiplicious as well when both are based on the same act, i.e., sodomy. 
Gamez, 2005 CCA LEXIS 109, at *13. It seems a military prosecutor could 
avoid the multiplicity question by simply basing the fraternization charge 
on anything but sodomy. 
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In cases like Gamez, however, where the fraternization and sodomy 
are based on different sex acts, one could argue that the subtle dis-
tinction between varying sex acts is meaningless because of Marcum's 
new requirements.255 The Marcum holding, in essence, states the cru-
cial fact now required to uphold consensual sodomy charges is the 
unauthorized relationship in conjunction with the sodomy.256 Thus, to 
be constitutional in the military environment, a consensual sodomy 
charge now requires an unauthorized relationship-based nexus, such 
as adultery or fraternization, making the relationship itself a key fact 
of the sodomy charge.257 Therefore the consensual sodomy offense 
and the relationship-based offense, regardless of any differences in 
the underlying sex acts, would be necessarily "factually the same,"258 
and thus, charging both would be multiplicious. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The newly created Marcum Test is constitutional and, for most ser-
vicemembers, expands their right to engage in private sexual con-
duct.259 The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces' rulings in 
Marcum and Stirewalt imply that the nature of the relationship between 
two people will form the basis for determining whether their conduct 
falls under the Lawrence protections.26o Appellate courts will uphold 
consensual sodomy convictions when the underlying relationship is 
unauthorized, while the converse will be true as well. 261 
The implication this may have on homosexual conduct has yet to be 
seen.262 If the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces continues to 
follow this relationship-based path, then it would seem consensual ho-
mosexual sodomy would be proscribed and within the government's 
right to prosecute.263 
Military prosecutors, however, have at their disposal a number of 
other punitive and administrative articles of the UCMJ with which to 
255. See supra Part V.C. 
256. See supra Part V.C. 
257. See supra Part V.C. 
258. United States v. Gamez, 2005 eCA LEXIS 109, at *8, *13 (A.F. Ct. Crim. 
App. March 30, 2005) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 59 MJ. 357,359 
(CA.A.F.2004)). 
259. See supra Part V.C. 
260. See supra Parts IV.E-F. 
261. See supra Parts IV.E-F., notes 224-25, and accompanying text. 
262. See supra Part V.C. 
263. See supra Part V.C. The military's homosexual policy is being challenged in 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. See Complaint at 2-
4, Cook v. Rumsfeld, Civil Action No. 04-12546 GAO (D. Mass. Dec. 6, 
2004), available at http://www.sldn.org/binary-data/SLDN_ARTICLES/pdf 
_file/ 1864. pdf; see also Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Mo-
tion to Dismiss at 1, 3, Cook v. Rumsfeld, Civil Action No. 04-12546 GAO 
(D. Mass. Feb. 7, 2005), available at http://www.sldn.org/binary-data/ 
SLDN_ARTICLES/pdCfile/1869.pdf. 
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punish those who violate military relationship regulations. 264 To sur-
vive the Marcum Test, these relationship convictions would be a pre-
requisite to any consensual sodomy conviction.265 Therefore, simply 
adding a consensual sodomy charge to the relationship charge may be 
multiplicious and, regardless, not necessary within the military envi-
ronment to punish the servicemember(s) involved.266 
Captain Erik C. Coynet 
264. See supra Part VI.A. 
265. See supra Part V.C. 
266. See supra Part VI.B. See also John Files, Pentagon Considers Changing the Legal 
Definition of Sodomy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2005, at A17. This article discusses 
a memorandum sent from the Department of Defense Office of the Gen-
eral Counsel to Congress calling for the end of the military's proscription 
of consensual sodomy. [d. The memorandum calls for a change in the law 
to only outlaw sodomy "with a person under age 16 or acts 'committed by 
force. ", [d. 
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